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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

I~

}

HE

(;lt;\:t\T \!AC"F'AHLAXE

Case

xo. 9051

--~--

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
THJ<j !<'ACTS

l'he cvitlcnce in this ca~e consists esscntia1ly (.[' a
conden~aiion ol' the reeonl in the ease of In Rl' Stw.n/s
Estate (Lltah), 293 Pae. (2d) G82. We are mindful thai
the court in that ease had an opportunity to examine the
record, and to familiarize itself with the facts. HoweYer,
since that ca~e was decirled there ha..-c been ~'lome changeR
in the vcrsonnel of the court, and we recognize that after
a lapse of more than three years' time, the facts may not
be fresh in the minds of the court. Since the statement
of fact.s presented hy petitioner emphasize>; those facts
favorable to him, and largely ignores those facts which
are unfavorable, and upon which the decision below was
based, we deem it necessary to set forth the following
facts in bold relief:

1
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1. Although Gale Swan technically had testamentary capacity, she was retarded mentally, and her mentality did not reach the adult leveL

II

'rhe undisputed testimony of her aunt, Bell Mart~oll', establishes that in early childhood Gale was afflicted
with ;;i·vere epilepsy; that when she was in her early
twenties, she was confined in a sanitarium at Battle
Creek, ~1ichigan; that at that time she knew nothing of
her surroundings and did not recognize members of her
family. When she returned to her family home in Salt
Lake, she brought with l1er a nurse, and from that time
&he continued under a nur~e 's eare until many yean latPr
\\·hen a remedy was fom1d wl1ich would control her
attacks. (R. 147-149)
Gale paid much more attention to men than to women.
"Gale believed in even·body. She had a cl1ildlike belief
those people have ... Gale has alwayo been a child to
me." (H. 153) "She had wr;- little judgment as to the
proper thing to do." (H. 15G)
'fl1e t r~timo11y of :Jirs. \lartsolf \I'IH corroborated
and confirmed by the testimony of Gale'~ sister, 'I'heo
Hendee. Gal had a ~erious illne~:; in 1949, after which
she seemed weak and confused. (R. 191)
Dnriug the last _1·enr~ ol' her life, she was under the
regulnr t'at"(' of psychiatl"i~ts. She was seen professionall-\· ill· Dr. Frank, a psydliatTi6t, 110 less tltan 60 times
in .tl~<·· ~-pnr l!l,·d, the Y<'::tr preceding her death. (R. 276)
Dr. [l;trk<'. atwlhcr ps~·(•ltintri~t. 'Yho e-xamined her at

,,
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the time the sc<>ond codidl was executed, testified that
she had a mental age of 12 and that she had failed to
mature mentally. His report was based in part upon
information furnished by Gale, by the accused, and by
Dan Koiltopolns, another beneficiary under her 'sill.
(K 286-288) Dr. Garlano:l Pace, another pO!ychiatrist,
vvho cared for her o:luring the latter years of her life, following tbe death of his i'nther who had previously eared
for her, testified that she did not have average intelligence; that lu:r intelligence was in the range of ages 11
to l:l, and tln1t she never matured mentally. II0 further
testified that ment.ul deterioration may aecompany e:·,ilepsy; that she \Ia~ ,•molir.nally immature, and that ~u1-li
persons are susecp!.ible io inflw•nec rmd ;mggestion.
(R 290-291)
Clair .:\lortensen, a trust offieer at \Valkel' Bank, who
handled l1er JJrnpcrty for her, testifieo:l that sbe was mol'('
susccplihlc to men than to women ar1d that she did rw!
have a normal adult mind. (R. 313) In hi~ opinion she had
the age of a l'our!l1 grader· in arithmetic aud writing.
(R. 350)
One of her companions, DDrofhy '\Vug~taiT, tc,;tilied
that Gale trusted people (H. 316), and that slw never: went
any place alone d1Jring Uw time H1at sllC knew llCr
(R. B21 ).

2. The fact that Gale was retarded waf! known or
should have been known to the accused.
::1frs. Hendee, Gale's sister, i11dicated to .Mr. 1\hwfarlanc that she was anxwus ahout hN sister Gale and
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that she would rely upon ~iacfarlane to keep her informed.
(R. 30) In 1950, Macfarlane learned that Gale had at~
tempted to make a loan to her friend Forsberg in the
approximate amount of $3,000. When Gale's father
learned of this, he immediately insisted that the money
be returned. Macfarlane also knew that Mr. Swan was
very tight-fisted. (R. 46) However, following the death
of }[r. Swan, Gale became much freer with the accused.
HJ1e executed to him a general power of attorney, plaeed
in hi~ custody the pass books to all of her bank aceounts,
and made gifts to him and members of his family of
stocks, bonds, and cash in the approximate amount of
$10,000. (R. 63 to 74)
At least a year before Gale's death, and possibly as
early as 1949 or 1950, Macfarlane learned that she was an
epileptic. (R. 53-54) He knew that she was under the
care of Dr. Pace, a psychiatrist (R 54), and also under
the care of Dr. Frank, another psychiatrist. (R. i8). He
also arranged for an independent medical examination
of Gale before the second codicil was executed, and knew
I hn t

a psychiatrist was called i11 to assist with the exami·
nation. (R. 42). He likewise knew that over the course of
the years from 1046 to the time of her death, Gale w~~
ronfined in the hospital many times, and he '·isitcd her
there. (R. 114·15) jJter her return from the hospital on
ml<.' orcasion, she was under the cRre of a trained nune.
(R. 136)

Il'hwh of Uw foregoing evidence comes from U1e lips
of tln' accused himself. In addition, there i~; the testimony
4
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of ~·Irs. Folden, a registered nurse who cared for Gale,
that Macfarlane came to the home quite often when Gale
wa~ a bed patient, and that he always closed the door to
her room when talking to her. (R 265, 272)
Dr. Frank testifi!id that he advised Mr. Macfarlane
tl1at Gale should have a guardian appointed. (R 276)
3. .\lacfa1'lane had reason to know, that in naming
himsdf a8 a betlefieiary of hie; client's will, he was eugaging in conduct which was al besl higl1ly questionable. It
has been urged that t1lf't'e are no canons of the Utal1 State
Bar or the ~\meriean Bar AsHoeiation prohibiting the conduct engaged in by Macfarlane, and ihat he had no rca~on
to be aware of any impropriety in wln1 t he wns doing. 1,(•i
us give to him the benefit of all doubt (a benefit, incidentally rwt accorded to any laymen, wllO are presumed to
know H1c law), and assume that. he harl no reasoiJ t.o be
aware of any qw:-stion eoncerning his conduct. at the· time
the original v.ill was drawn, still forcible notice of this
came t.o his attrntion prior to the time the t'in;t codicil
was drawn when a will contest was filed i.n the probate of
another will prepared by him wherein l1c wao; de8ignat.ed
as a beneficiary. (R. 56, 79) TJmt will contest was suh~e
quently compromised and apparently 1facfarlane at that
time had sufficient conerrn as to the corrertrJCSS of his procedure to warrant his makir1g some concessions in that

will rontest.

After thic; he still proceeded to draw ho

codicils for Gale Swan, the first of which increased his
intcrrst as a beneficiary under the will, and in the second
of which he maintained a very substantial interest to the

5
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extent that he was the largest single beneficiary nnder the
will, rcc;eiving more than one-third of the entire estate.
It is significant to note here that Mr. Clair ~\Iortensen,
not an attorney, was fully aware of the impropriety of
such condud. Although Gale wanted to remember ~l r.
}! ortensen in her will, he requested her not 1o do so, stating that such would be emlmrrassing to him. Certainly,
the relationship of tr11st. officer to a client is no more delicate nor of higher fiduciary status than that of attorney
and client.
4. With full knowledge of Gale's comlitirm, and that
hN sist.cr was looking io him for ihc protection of her
intere~t (R. 30)) and that he was the major beneficiary
under the will, "\facfarlane llever so much u:; suggested
that Gale seek independent counsel, legal or otherwise.

'l'he testimony of the aeeused establishes that Jlo
one knew the contents of t.he will, or any of the (~odicils,
but Gale and the accused (R. 37-4-1). llO\Ie\er, }[acfarlane told .Hrs. Hendee at onC' t.ime that Gale bad ttiken
care ol' her property and that it was in good shape. He
never wggested to her at any time tint! she consult with
anyone else. ( 45)
3. 'l'he gifts to accused were wholly out of proportion to :my sta111ling he might haYe as a friend and c01!·
fident. of Gale and. her famih. The ac.cuscd became Gale's
JH'r~onal :1ttorney in about 1944. Thereafter he repre~ented her in l'arious transactions. and for every service
n'nd('red hy lJim, he billed her in full for what l1c' consid6
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ered ihe fair value of his services. All of his bills were
promptly and fully paid. By the terms of the 'Yill and
the eodi\·ils, the accused recein.'d in l'X\'Co>S of ~::J:i,OOO
worth of propcrt;.~, in addition to more tlitm ~10,000 in
f!ifts of nt~h and securities, prior to Calc's death, making
a total of on'r' $10;),000 out of an estate of $272,000 (R.
4:2.. 283). 'l'hus 1\il'. ~laefarlane received more than one·
third of the cnii.t·e estate. Kostopolus had recein>d gifts
approximal ely 0q llfl l to tl1ose tceei n~d by ::\{r. :rvr acfarlanc,
and bi~ ~hare of the testament al'y d i;:;posit ion was a1 iproxiroatdy equaL This left substantially leHs than one-third
of the estate for the si~ter Theo, and .\unt Bell Martso~f,
and for other close personal friends.
The testimony of the sister Thco reveals that although Theo was r:l1UTicd in 191+, ami tl1ereai'(N l':•"irJ,,d
witl1 bcr hu;:;band, Jlrsl. l'or se>eral yean in lhc enHi., and
then lakr on t.he wc•st coast, she maintained ll.S close as
po~sible relationship with her o;ister Gale. Theo Yisited
in the family homo at lca"t once eaeh year, and many year·s
~('H'ral times a year. She abo mainLained <eonhwt ,,-ij]l
Gale by telephone nnd r:orrc~ponrlPlll'<'. She invited Gale
to ViHiL with hN in her home in San Francisco. She regarrled the relationship as a dose relationship between
sisters throughout their lives (R. 166). She also paid the
expen~es of Aunt Bell l'VIan~olr to r:ome hom California
to visit with Gale and l1cr father.
Aunt Bell Martsoll' had abo been particularly close
to the family, especially after the deatb of

Gale·~

mot.hcr.

Before the death of Mrs. Swan ihe family had visited
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cadi year al the home of Aunt Bell. '!'hereafter, Aunt
Bell visited regularly at the Swan home in Salt Lake for
periods ranging from two -weeks np to five months. Im.
mediately after the death of ).lr~. Swan, Mrs. }ia.rtsolf
took over the care of the Swan household and the caring
for Gale until satisfactory help could be engaged. ~irs.
Marisolf was finally remembered in the second codicil
with a generous $100 bequest.
The gifts reC'eived by "\fr. .:\lacfarlane and Mr. Kostopolus were out of all proportion to what they might
properly and normally have been expected to receive
as friends of the family, in Yiew of the fact that Gale waa
survi1·ed by a full sister, \1itl1 whom sl1c had maintained
a close n!latiomhip throughouL l1cr life, and by an aunt
who hr.d been almost a :;econd mother to ber. In addition,
there \H're otber friends of t.hc family such as "\[r. Bean
who 1·.isited ai !l1c home enry day, performed housdll)ld
d1ores and regularly tDok bis meals there, and the
Rridge~, wbo entertained Gale at eards t-wo or three times
a week. Tbcse friendships would appear to be of at least
equal:>tmHli11g to those of "\[r. "\faefarlane ,md Kostopolus. IIoWI'Yer, .:'lir . .:'lfad'arlane and Kostopolus received
in excess of two-thirds of tlw estall'. and the other.< received lese; than one-third among all of them, some of
them in amounts which were mere trifles.
It is upou thi~ factuul background, aided 11~· the presumption ol" [raud, aN set forth in this eomt'~ decision in
tl1c l:'wnn cnAl', npon which tlw findings of the hearing
t·ommiH,·.ion and the bar commission were based, and upon
wl1it·l1 thp~· shonld be affirmed.

8
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ARGUJ.IENT
noted in the oral argum•:nts before the hearing- committee (R. :i56), the Supreme Court has already
concluded in thE' \1ill coni<:~t case tl1at tl1erc l1;1~ been a
civil fraud commitlrd hy an at.lonJL'Y against his client.
The basic question to be t1cre decided i~ whNh1·r an attorney who has c1mnnitt.ed a L'ivil fraud agaim;t bi.-·. client
should be disciplined. ln reaching tlw conclusion that a
1'i1·il wrong had been commit.t.ed, tlw Supreme Court hm;
s:1itl in the will IJOnicst 1'116l' that it eoulrl not RO hold on
the facts adtluc·ed wiJl10ul th0 aid of a prenmption of
fraud.
As

Wfl<'>

No new evidence ltas been introduced, nor was there
any other cvid0nce available to the [lroser.ut.ing comm!tier. At ihc outset, we suppo01c it must be determined
what effect the court should give to previom; ciYil determination that a fraud has been committed. We do not
contend that this is eon trolled by the procedures in ca~c~
where an attorney is conYictcd of a felony in a separate
criminal case, hut. the distinclion we seek to make here
ean be demonstrated by reference to the procedures in a
felony case. After an attomey is convicted of a felony in
a criminal case, discipline automatically follows. The
court docs not go bcl1ind the Ycrdict to re-examine the
facts to see lww t.he conviction resulted. It accepts the
prior judicial detnmination of guilt. It is suffiiJicnt that
the attorney has been tried and convided.
In this case the defendant was charged in a civil suit
vrith having defrauded his client and after an exhaustiYe

9
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trial an:l an appeal to this court, it has now been :finally
adjudged that the defenda11t did defraud his client. The
property which he sought to obtain by reason of the fraud
was tuken from him. Query: Docs this adjudged fact
that lw has pNpetrated a civil fraud against his client by
itself justify dis(•iplinary ad ion; if not. will this fact be
consiUctiJd at all: or will the court disregard tllC civil trial
and the facts therein adjudicated and hear the matter
anew!
It dar~ present a somewhat anomalous situation if
the defendant can he adjudged in a contested civil suit to
}Jan· been guilty of fraud against. lliJ> client and in a dis!mrment pron~cding based on the same facts can be l1eld
not to he guil1}' of any fraud, but to be dean as a hound's
tooth and immune from discipline. lf the maHer is to be
considered auew, and the presumption of fraud which was
raised in the eivil suit ('lH\ not be r11ised in the disbarment
pr·oecctlings, of course, this end result might well be
reaehed. The general public is then told 011 the one hand
that there is ample evidence to ~upport the trial court'~
:finding that the pd.ilioner defrauded his client in the civil
~uit but in the di~harment procecdin~.; where the same
factR are rc•1 ir·wr·d again, and tlt<' court c01wludcs (because it ean not. consider the presumption) that there was
uo fraud and the attor11n·',., conduct was enti.rcly proper .

. \s i~ point(•d out in more detail by the authorities
d\•d ]'('low, the Supreme Court. h;> licensing a lawyer.

J"ccommends the lawy('l' to the public as morally qualified
to n•prp,.;ent (']i,•nts in matters involving the highest trust

10
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and confidence. If we are to ~urry t.he argument made by
the ncen~rrl here into effeet, '""e certainly ean not help Lnt
~hake the confidence of the public in the entire legal profes.,ion. l11 the civil case this court has alT'e>~d~ helrl that
the rvideTTI'I\ aided by the presumption, amply supported
th~e trial eourl 's finding of fraud by an attonu•y in regard
to Uw affair.~ ol' l1i~ client. The same evidrnn~ i» again
before the court lor r0Yiew. 'l'hrough the appli1·n1ion of
a h·gal nicety, tlTc' uu·n~cd urge>< t.hP court to hold that
his conduct ·was entirely prrprr, that what he ditl I.e; ],j,o;
cli,~nt y;as without fault, Umt he should be given a dr•:Hl
bill of health and tl1is eourl ,Jwuld continue to n·<·<m~ml•nd
him to the pnblie :1~ in every way worthy of tlu;ir (1"11'-'i
and confidenc·e.
lf the court accepts this argument l1er0, il I ells the
pulllic that there is some tedllliculit.y in lhe law which
"'rill permit the court to raise a pr0s.umpJion of fraud to
protcd a dieiJt wl10 ha~ been impoRrd upon, but that th<:>
law will not permit the eourt t.o rai;;e the Rame presumption Jo proted the pul1lic againo;t future miseoiJdnc.t.; tln1t
the pllhlie should 11ccepJ ihe high court's reeomrncndution of Jhe lawyN tB a man of the highest int~:grily, although thr court. has already held that tl1e C"vi1lenc0 ir;
the civil ;;nit amply supports a finding that he defmuderl.
his client. N otwitho;tanding this adjutliealed fact of fraud,
tlw court must now find from the same 0virlence that hi~
condu("t was entirely proper, jhat he Rhould not h~· di,.wi-

plined at all, and that the eonrl slJOuld hold him out to
the pnblie without ecnsurc or criticism as a man worthy
of the highest trust and confidence from hiR clients. Such

11
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an anomalous result ought not to be permitted by the law,
and wht>n one 1;xamines the true nature of the right to
practice law and the true nature of a disbarment proceeding, we submit. that there is no reason why the presumption can not or should noi be rai8Ni in a disbarment
proeeeding.
If the effect of Ole civil suit is t.o be disregarded, and
tliL' eYidenee is to he reviewed anew in the disbarment
ptoceedings, then the issue ol' law a~ to whether the preJ:mmption will be raised becomes a 1·ital consideration.

Our brief is primarily direrted to that point. We desire, however, to 110te that the presumption does not stand
alone. U is raised for the very practical reason that. general!) only t.he attorney and the client parti<-'ipated in the
conferences and they and only they know what happened.
In this case the client is dead, and if there \\·ere 110 presumption, fraud eould seldom be pro1·ed. ln a civil suit
where facts which in and of themselves lay a suspicion of
fraud at the door of the accused are proved, this places
upon him tl1e burden of coming l'orward to conYi11cc the
trier of tlw fad that no fraud was involved. The same
difficult~· of proof exist~ in a disbarment proceeding a~
exisL~ in a civil action. The difficulties of finding t.'l·idence
are equally great. 'l'hr circumsta nr'l'~ raio;ing tlll' Sllspicion
r>l' l'raud are the same, and there is much common sen~e in
pla('in~ the same hnrden nf ex]ilnnation on the accusrd.
We emplw~ize that tltr' presumption need not and
dOI'H not stailrl alone. Thrrr' are facts cmdisputahly proved
s]IO'.\·ing tlwt the aeClJHrd was dealin~ with a client ,,·ho

1:2
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was mentally retarded. He was told by her sister that the
family was looking to the accused to protect her interests.
(H. 30) During her lifetime, he wt,; tlw redpient of variou.-J sub8tantial gifts (H. 63-14) and l1e knew that his
client. who wa~ mentally rct.anJcd, w:ts making like gifh;
to ::.\Ir. Kostopulo.~, wl10 according to the finding of the
court, was guilty or fraud and undue influenee. l<'inally,
tli(· accused did draft a will which made him a major
beneficiary. He did so, even though near tl1at ver·y time
he was beir1g charged in another suit wit\1 improper (TildJ.wt in drafting a will for another dient whieh al8o namcd
him as a major Leucfieiary. He must ·have seen a sufli6c-nt.
problem conn'rning the testamentar;t capaeity of l1i.~
client in tl1is ease to warrant taking her to a doctor. The
tlndnr called in a TJ~)'('lJiatrist and thereafter the will was
e:-..~~{'111\~d. Ccr1,1inly tl1e defendant ought to haYe the burden of <'xJllflining his r•ondud. and this burden can only be
placed upon him hy raising a presumption whieh v.i.ll shift
the risk of persuasion.
We have divided our discmmion of this presumption
into thr·ee patis.
We first refer t.o the U tab eases concerning the nature
of the right or pri\'ilege of praetieing law. Sinee the practice of law is a privilege and not a right, and since the
purpose of disbarment proccctliug~ is to purify tlre Bar·not to punish-we tl1ink lhere is reason for raising 1l1e
presUIIJption of fra111l in a disha.rment proceeding. \Vc
secondly examine the- na.tul'e of the presumption itself;
and finally cite tlre authorities which permit the preAumption of fraud to be considered in a disbarment proceeding.
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I. XATURE OF DlSCIPLIXAHY PROC!iJEDIXGS
BY THE BAR cm.nussrox:

A. lli8fory of the Right to Pmctice Lan-:
The rigflt to practic·c lm\- is a special privilege which
is held during the good bdm\·ior of the pcr.~on so licensed.
}.:]ember~ of tl1e legal profe:;;;i.on are charged with a part i(·ularly higl1 moral and elhi(·al responsibilit~ because
they receiYc OlC confidences of the pullli(~. Lawyers are
Ui~ciplined or disbarred if at any time i1 f!eems that their
character is such that it docs not eompletely justify the
confidence and tru~t that the public mu~t place in them.
:.Inch has lJecn said and written about the 11at.urc of
the rigM to pnH"t i('c law. lt is not a property right, nor is
it a privilegC" 1mder the privileges and immm1ities elausc
of tiH; l•'ederal Constitution. The Utah rase of Ruckenbrod Y. Jlullins, 102 Ct.ah 548, cono;idered the attorney's
duty to defend indigeJJt persons charged with criminal
ads. That ease

give~

a rather comprehensive history of

the legal profession and the nature of U1e right to practice la\\-. Since this subjed is. of consirlerable importance
in the instant proceeding, extensive

quotc~

from that (:ase

migbt be helpful. 'l'he Rucke11brod case, in turn, quotes
h1•nvily from other sourcp;.c and th<'i<C quotations are includl.'ll in the following excerpts:
of ju1·i~dif·tions hold that an
n j t ,ll'IIP\' i~ an officer of t lw ('Onrt witl1 many rights
nnd 11Ti1 il('~l's, nnd must accept his office cum
'"l'he

majoriJ~-

Olll'\'\',''
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"~ ~ ~

Historically there ran be little donbt
that tlte nttorney who represented a client before
the courts did enjoy special rights and priYileges.
'l'he historical growth of the right of an attorney to
praelire before the common law courts in F~ngland
is den~ lope• I l1:- tl:<' S IIJ•l'Cme Court of Illinois in tl1c
case of In re IJny, e( al, 181 Ill. 13,54 XE fl4G, G49,
50 LRA .)El, the court there said:
'Originally, no one could appear hy attorney without the speeial warrant of the king,
issuing out of chancery or under seal, granting thr privilege. The king was eonsidert•d
tlw fOJmttJin of j11~tice, and, a~ he could not in
person d0ride all ronirovPrsiC's and Temedy all
wrow:s, tlll' ir1jur0d parlies w0rc: referred to
tltc' proper for·um, aud \Hits W<'l'C l'rnr~lr·d in
his name to his judge.~. Suitf; were begun i11 tl1ut
way, and when he granted the prh·ileges in
question it was a~ tl ptlrt. of that system, and
not in a legif!lative capacity. ln tl riYilizerl
country, wh0re tlw rigl1ts of person,; ll'er<: to
he determined in arcordanel..l witl1 esUJloli~lred
rule~, eithrr sttJt.ut.or·y or· pmmulgated l•y tl•e
C011rt~. t.l1e employml•nt of persons ac•quainted
wit.ll tlw~e rules bec•.ame a necessity, both to
Ow par(.i<'s and the court. Persons uulearnerl
in tl:e law cm1 neither aid a litigant nor the
eouri, and parliament, at different times, extended the right of t.he litigant to appoint an
attomey to represent him in court. Maugl1,
Attyi'. Append. fi, 7. In 1292, Edward I madr
an order hy which he appointed the lord chief
juf!tice of the cmrd of rommon pleas tlnd Ow
rest of his fpJlow juslirrs of that court., tint!
they, aceording to their discretion, slwuld
provide and ordain from C'Yery county eedain
attumeys and appt·cntices of t.lw he:-;t and
most apt for tl•eir learning tlnd skill, who
might do service to i1is court and people, and
]_;)
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those so chosen only, and no other, ,;hould follow his court and transact the affairs thereof.
the said king and his council then deemingth~
number of seven score to be sufficient for that
employment, but it was left to the discretion
of the said justiee~ to add to that number or
dimini;;h it, as they should see fit. 7 Pol. & }d.
Hi;;. Eng. Law, 194; Dugd. Orig. J.l41. The
prni'cs;;ion of att.orney was placed under the
control of the judges, and the discretion to
examine applicants as to their learning and
quali!ications, and to admit to practice, was
exercised from that day by the judicial department of the English government, and 110
legislation sought to deprive the court of the
power in that ,·r~pect, or t.o invest it in any
other branch of the govcrnmeiJt.'
''The court in some detail then discussed the
variou~ early English Statutes relating to admission to practice; the fuJIC:l ion of t.he Inns of Court;
and the role of "solieitors' and 'barristers'; and
concluded that:
''I'he function of determining whether one
who seeks to become an officer of the courts,
and to conduct cau,;es therein is ~ufficicntly
acquainted with tllC rules established by the
lcgio;lature and the courts, governing the
rif'hts of parties and under which justice i>
administered, pertains to the courts themselve;;_ ~ ~ ~ 1'he order of requisite qualifications, under sueh rc,;trictions and lirrritat in us as may lll' properly imposed by tl1e legislature for the protection aud welfare of the
public. Thr fad that the legislature may prescrilw the qualifications ol' doctors, plumlwrs,
horse;<hoeJ·~. and persons following otlwr profc~8ions or callings; not connected with the
judicial system, and maY Ray what shall be
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evidenced of such qualifications, can have no
influence on this question. A license to such
pel'wns confers no right to put the judicial
power in motion or to participate in judicial
proceedings. The attorney is anecesomry part
of the judicial ,.,ysicm, and l1i6 vocation is not
merely t.o find persons who are willing to ha Vl'
lawsuits. He is the first one to sit in judgment on every ca~e, and wh0t.her the court
slmll be called upon io act depends on his
decision.' ~ ~ ~
'The courts of the King'~ Bench and
Common .Ple:1s had from t.h0 first, each admitt('d its own staff of atlonwys and tl1c Jjjxcbeqnel' seems to have had a staff of clerks
who acted as attorneys. Xo doubt the same
persons often acted tb attorneys hot.h in the
Common Pleas and in the King's Benc-h this is slwwn by an onler of 1564-, whid1 attempted in vain to suppress this praetice. But
it is olwious that the necessity for separate
admission in each court emphasized the fact
that attorneys were the officers of that eo\lrt;
and the same fad was still furt.her emphasized by orders for their constant attendanec•
in their re~pective ("Ourts, and by tlwir po~
session of t.h0 same privileges of exception
from rmblic sen-·iee, aml irmnnnit.y from suit,
(·xc<'pl jn their ow1J court, as the other officials
of the various courts enjoyed.'
"* * ~ In People v. Culkin, 248 NY 4G5, 162
KE 487, 490 60 ALR. 851, Ch. J. Chardozo traces
the hi~tory of the pow(lr of the court~ to make general jnqniri.es into the c•onduct of its own oJ1irers,
the members of the bar, awl concludes that at a
very early date the courts ex-ercised ripirl control
over the professiona~ conduct of m-embers of the
legal profession. He states:
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''l'hus by Section I of an order made in
,\{iehadmas Term 1654 by the Court of Pleas
. order of the Court of rp-'
as well as by a like
per or King's Bench, attorneys were required
to give notice of their chambers of habitations
"und(•r pain of being put off t.he roll"; no
one \Jnder like penaUy was to practice in another\; name, nor was anyone knowingly to
permit another to pradille in hi~ mlme, excepting in warrants of attorney for common
recoveries "for the preveiltion of maintennw·e and broeage, no attorney was to be
le~see in an ejectment nor hail for a defendant
in tl(i.s eourt in any action." Cooke's Rules,
Ordrrs and X otices of the CourtR of Common
Pleas and King's Bench, Michaelmas 'ferm,

] 654.'
"Such duties and others are placed upon attorneys on the theory that attorneys are officers of
the court. In speaking of the;;e duties Cardozo further ~ny~ in People v. Culkin, supra:
':\I embership i11 the bar is a privilege burdened with condition.:;. 111 re Rouss, supra, 221
::\'Y (81 ), page 84, 116 I>;E (782), 783. The
appellant was received into that ancient fellowship for something more than private
gain. He "became an officer of tl1e court, and
like the court i(~elf, an instrument or agency
to advance tl11; ends of justice. His cooperation with the eonrt was due, whenever justice
would be imperiled if cooperation wa~ l'ithheld. lie might be assigned as counsel for the
need;.·, in causes criminal or eiYil, serving
without pny. Code l'rim. Proc. ~ 308; Ci1·iJ
PrndieP _\rh, .,qoG, 198. He might lie diro·("i('(l by ;;ummary order to make restilution
(o n client of Hl(llH'Y" or other property wrongl"(d!~· 11·itlill('ld. In re H.
........ 87 NY fUl.
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He might be censured, suspended, or disbarred for "any conduct prejudicial to ihe
administration of justice." Jndir,iary Law,
§88, Subd. ::!. All this is undisputed.'
"'I'he present status of the attorney in our
judicial system has been a result of historical development which dates back for some sen'n centuries. Regardl0~s of what may have happened in
some jurisdietiom to the rip:lit.s and pr·ivileges of
attorneys, the right to praetirJe before the r:ourt as
an officer of the court, still remains. \VIrile doetori'\, plumbers, electricians, barbers, et.c., may sell
t.heir time and skill to the public by virtue of their
license from the sJ.HtP, ihc attorney alone has the
right. t.o set t.hc judieial mac·hincry in mot.ion in
bclialf oi' aTtother and to thus participate as an
officer or tlre court in a judicial proceeding. This
J"ight springs from his status as an officer of the
court. To properly function it is neces!ltuy that
courts retain control of their officers. The attorney's part haEt developed until he now is a necessary and essential part of our judicial machinery.

*

~

In addition to this privilege, it has
been comisiently lteld that the right of the legislative branr:h ot" the government to regulate and
control attorneys is subject to the ir1herent power
of the t'(JUJ"t ultimately to control admission io
praeticc awl disbarment. ·while the languagP in
Ili_qgin8 v. Burton, G4 Utah 502. 232 P. 914, might
indicate U1at we do not adhere to this rule, in a
later case, ln re flarr:lay, 82 Utah 288,24 P. 2d 302,
303, we ~~ at.ed:
"t

'ft is quite generally held that the power
i~ inherent in the proper eourt to discipline,
suspl'nd, or disbar an attorney for miscondud, i.ndCp<'WJent OJ' llll)" express provision of
a ~tntut.e ("Oril·~·rring such authoril.".'
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"In support of thi8, we cited an earlier case,
ln. re Platz, 42 Utah 439, 132 P. 390, 392, where we
stated;
'Nor can the Legislature limit the courts
in their rights to determine the moral qualifications of Uwir officers or prevent them from
refusing to admit morally incompetent persons to practice, nor compel them to retain
such upon the roll. * ~ ~ The courts, and
not. juries or legislators, mmt ultimatelv determine l[utdifications and fit.11ess of -their
officers.'
"If the right to engage in the practice of law
wc•n• one of those rights protected by the 14th
Amendment. it might he unconstitutional to require those who engage in tile pnwtice of law to
submit to the burdens now placed on the legal profession. But the cases hold Jhat tile rigl!t to practice law in the state courts i" not a privilege or an
immunity of a citizen of the Cnited States which
is protected by the 14th Amendment. In Ex parte
Lockwood, lJ± US 116, 14 S. Ct. 1082, 1083, 38
L. Ed. 929, the court refused to reYi.ew the order
of the Virginia Sup. Court which denied the application of a woman for admittance to the bar of
Virginia. The court, in so holding, said;

'The right to control and regulate the
granting of license to practice law in the
courts of a state i.,_ one of those powers th~t
was 110t transferred for its protection to the
federal government, and it8 exerdse is in no
manner governed or controlled by citizenship
of the United States in the party seeking such
license.' See also Philbrook v. Newman, C.C.,
85 F. 139, Mil che/1 \'. Greenough, 9 Cir., 100 F.
2d 184; Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 \Vall 130, 83
llS 130,21 L. Ed. 442, Robinson's case (In re
Robinson), 131 .:.!a8-". 376,41 Am. Rep. 239.
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"\Ve, therefore, conclude attorneys do have
privileges. They do enjoy the right to participate
as officer~ in a judicial proceeding and the right
to set the judicial machinery in motion. The coud
in admitting the attorney to practice, presents him
to the public as worthy of its eonfidf'nce in all of
his proressional duties . .An attorney holds his office during good beha.rior a-nd may only be depr-i·nPd of it fur misconduct ascertained a11.d decla-red by the judgmn~t of the court. Courts, by
retaiuin.g ultimate co1drol of admission to practice and of disbarme-nt, have undertaken to proffrf
the honor and high standimg of the legal profession
by refusing to admit those applica·ut.o who lack th13
neces.~ary educational qualifications or H'fio are
morally incompeten-t, and dropping from the rolls
those gu.ilty of misconduct." (emphasis added)
The next "Ctah case of eon~cqucnC'e explaining the nature of d1c right to prat'\i1·c law was Du:c·i~; v. Ogden ('·ity,
215 P. 2d 616. That. ease lJOnsidered the rigllt. of the City
of Ogden to require lawyers to ohtain u City liceme. In
holding ihal the ordinance was valid, ihe Court again
discus~ed t.he position of members of the legal proff'ssion.
The Utah

case~ thu~

demonstrate that the practice of

law has been a special fr·mrdrise from lhe very beginning.
It iH clear that one who engages in the pradice ol' ht·w
holds that franchi6e only during hil-l good behavior and

so long as he maintains an impcecablc moral character·.
Indeed, to Ray that one has a right to practice law is prubably a misnomer, for in a more aceuraJ('
"right" at all, but is merely a special

~ensc,

it is no

privilc~e

I"OJldi-

tioned upon moral worthiness.
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B. Presumption of Innocence.
\Ve now move to a consideration of the question as
to whether tlwre is a preumption of innocence in a disei,
plinary proceeding whieh is not present in an ordinary
civil proCC"<?-ding nnd whicl1 will ofTset the presumption of
fraud. n i~ elemt'ntal in thE' law tha.t a defendant being
prosecuted for alleged criminal acts is "presumed'' innocent until proven guilty. This really means 110thing more
than that the prosecution h11s the burden of proving the
defendant guilty beyond a reaf!onable doubt, and if the
guilt is not tbus proved there can be 1111 COT1vidion. Professor ).lcCormick explains tlw l1i~tnr) of this presumption of innocence in the following terms:

''Th,, pres;,mpfi(jJt of inJwcence. 'I'l1is phrase,
taken o1·er from contincnfal usage, wus merely a
geueral rule that in ab~cnce of contrary facts it
was to be as8umed H1at any person·~ conduct upon
a giYen oecasion w11s lawful. :So stated, the as·
sumption doubtless has a fair basis in probability.
J3ut when i1. came to he employed, in argument 11nd
in instructing juries, in eriminal trial~ under the
common law, it became a source of mysticism and
confusion. As avplied to the ac.cnsed, any assumption, o1· 'presumption' of innocence in the popular
sense of an infcn·Jt(·r based on probability, i:;
absurd. Tlw probubility is the n'H'l'SE'. 'T'he assumption of innoeence which is ret~sonable in the
absence of contrar~- facts becomes quite unrealistic
wlll'n we indude in the picture the facts that the
per:;on has been officially charged with the crime
and has he en brought to trial. N everthelesg, the
phrase 'presumption of innocence' ha~ been adopted hy jwlg''" as a conYenient introduction to the
statement of tliL' lmrdens upon the prosecution,
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first of producing evidence of the guilt of the accused and, second, of finally persuading the jury or
jttdge of Lis guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.. But
tl1e popular meaning of presumption as an inferCll~e from probability has lent a false connotation, and dei'C'IISI; counsel have naturally used the
phrase in a1·gument and in request..~ for instructiom;, as if it meant that there wa~ an inherent
probability that one officially charged and tried for
a rrime is innocent."

'

'

'

''The supposed presumption of the innocence
of an accused, in fact, is not in any common usage
of the term a pres11mpt.ion a.t all. It is not a presumption in the popular sense of an inference from
prohahilit.y, 110r i~ it a preJ:Jumpt.ion in tl1e legal
~rllN<' or a rule as to the effect of facts proven as requiring or permitting other facts t.o he taken aJ:J
true." McCormick, Evidence, pp. 647 -O!J (Hl54).
Tl1e rtah Supreme Court has al~o tl1oroughly analyzed this "presumption," but it recognizC'd e%CIItia11y
the same mear1ing in the Swan case, supnt, \1hcn it. saiU:
"The expresf!ion that. there is a 'presumption
of innocence' if! frequnPtl.v \JSetl e\'l'll i11 (·ivil caHc~
where mif!conduct i~ im•olved, hut. it is usually used
to indicate a permi~~iblc infetenee and not a mmldatory presumption. But even where a. presumption is indi(·akd, 01uch presumption nullifies other
presumptions only in cases where the facts giving
rise to the presumption have no tendency to e~tab
li~h guilt and are not by their nature oppo8ed to
innocence. Such presumption of fraud and undue
influence iR everywhere recognized but. we know
of no case whicl1 hold~ that ~uch presumption i~
nullified by tllC prr~umvt.ion of innocene0. lf such
were the effect of a pr·esnmption of inno(Jencc, it
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would completely nullify all presumptions of fraud
and undue influence for in every such Gaso the confidential advisor is presumed to be guiHy of betravll:Jg the confidence placed in him. It would be us;>
lesf! to hold tl1at there is a presumption of fraud
and undue influence against him whi(•h is nullified
by a <'Ontrary presumption of innocence.'' (pa.,.e
693-4 of ~93 P. 2d)
"'
In summa l'.V, then, a I t.on1eyo; are privileged to engage
m a profession which requires the highest moral and
ethical responsibility. When a member of the bar is guilty
or misconduct, the Comt i~ charged witli the responsihility of diseiplininK and disenfranchising that
attorney. Di~!'iplinary proceedingfl are tlJU~ designed to
protect the p11hlic by dropping from membership those
members of the bar wl1o fail to deserve the confidences of
the public. The New .Jersey Courl ~11mmarized the purpoRe of disciplinary proceedings i11 the following words:
'' 'l'he object is not punishment of tl10 oJFonder,
buJ rather tlJC disqualification in the public interest of a prad iti0110r of the law who has been guilty
of misconduct indicative of moral unfitness for the
profession." 1 u re Frankel, 20 X J 558, 120 A. 2d
603 (1956)
Even if disbarment proceedings wrre punitin•, it is
unlikely that a preflumption of innocence could offset the
presumption of fraud and undue influence. In light of
the fact that such proceediugs are essentially for the
protection of the public, it srrms dear that no pre~ump
tion of imlm'('ll('(' is present. There flurely is nothing in
the law to indicate that an attorney charged with miseondud can claim a presumption of innoccnre in disbarment proceedings in order to lessen his burden of proof.
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II. THE NA'rURFl OF THE PRESF.\IPTIOX OF
\<'RAUD IN CIVTL PROCEEDIXGS.
Legal authorities universally recognize that there is
much confusion which surroundR the terms of "presumption,'' '' inferenee,'' and ''burden of perRuasion.'' ), good
diseussion in this hazy area if! found in McCormick. Evidenoo, Seetions :l06-22 (1Y54), and an analysis of t11c
Utah m~c'S is found in 1~tah Law Rev-iew, ;):196-219
{1956). But the Utah Supreme Court has made a elcar
pronouncement in the very case that gaYe rise to tl1e instant disriplinary proceeding, and it, therefore, seems
unneecssary to consider authority other than In re Swan's
Estate, 4 Ctah 2d 277, 293 P. 2d 682 (1956).
In the Swa;n case the court focused its attention upon
the presumption of fraud and undue influence w}1id1
arises when a confidential adviser drafts a ·will for his
client and names him~clf as beneficiary. Tt was conrcded
that, even among tllC Utah cases, substantial confusion
existed. 'l'he court distingui:;hcd between the h11rden of
persua,<;ion and the burden of making n prima facie case,
.;tating that in the latter situation the burden i~ satisfied
and the presumption vanisheo; with the introduetion of
prima facie ev-idence, and the other party still has tl1r
burden of persuading the faet finder. \\Then the burden
is one of persuasion, however, prima facie evidence is insufficient and the presumption remains, and the party
attempting to rebut Llie presumption of fraud mu"t ("ome
forth with evidenc·e which will be ·weig-hed against the presumption. It was held that the instant situation was one
requiring a burden of persuasion.
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'rhe court next examined the weight of evidenM required to oYercome the presumption of fraud when the
burden is one of persuasion. It wall noted that some cases
require a preponderancT of the evidence (non-existence
of the presumed fact. i~ more prol.Jable than its existence),
o!.l1er cases require clear and convincing n·idence (nonC'x:i~tcnte of the presumed fad is very highly prol1able),
and still others require proof lJeyOlJd a reasonable donUt
(all rea~onabk doubt of t.he non-existence of the pres1rmed
faet mn~t. be eli.m.inated). The court observed that there
\Vas considerable Utah authority to tlw efff'("t that in cases
of presumed fraud the ptcsumpJion should only be overcome by clear and convincing eYidencC'. Tt ,,.as felt, however, that the lw~l rule was the orw requiring a mere preponderance of the evidence, and the court e:xpre~sly
so held:
"After earcful study and considerati011 we conelude that thiR presumption shifts the burden onto
the confidential adYisn· of per~uadi11g or convinr,
ing the fact :finder by a preponderance of the evidence chnt no fraud or undue influeJJCe was
exerted, or in other 11 nrd~. he has the burden of
convincing the fact Iinder from the evidence that
il i~ more probable thar he ar-ted perfectly fair
\l-ith his c'onfidaut; that he made complete disclos"
urc of all material iJll'ormation available' and took
110 unfair ad•·antag-e of his superior position than
that he ('xerted fraud or undue influence io obtain
the benefit~ in question. This i8 contran- to our
l10lding in the .r ardine ease, whicl1 i,- supported by
the L\dil"ornia ('11~Ps and some other decisions thai
clear and convincing eYidenee to the coJltrary is
nc('('>'S<HY to overcome such presumption. 1\'e
reach this conclusion been use Wl' feel tlitlt the rule
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is more clear and understandable than the rule requiring clear and convincing evidence; that this
rule is more apt to produce a ju~t. re>;ult is more
generally reco;<nized as the correct rule governing
tl1is situation."
The court therefore held that (1) the instant l'acts
gal'e rise to a prco;umption of fraud and undue infltH:nce;
(2) that U1is presumption could be overcome by a
preponderance ol' the evidence; (3) that Mr. :Macfarlane
came forward witlt a prima facie ca.'le which was not a
preponderance of the evidence and which was, thereJ'ore,
insufficient to rebut ihe presumption; and (4) that, C'OJl~equently, the trial court's finding of fraud and uwlue
influence sl1ould he affirmed.

III. PRESUMPTION OF FRAUD SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED WITH ALL OTHER EVIDENCE
IN DISBARIIIENT PROCEEDINGS.
As explained in Section fi of this .\f enwrandum, the
Swan case holds that tl1e presumption of fraud in eivil
proceedings can he overcome by a vrep,J·n.rlerance of the
evidence. 1'hls l~ lo ~ay U1Ht the vet")' nature of the
confidential relationship c-reales a prima faeie presumption of fraud, and this prPsumption is only overcome when
the attorney priJres thai his rondur:t wail proper. }inch
has been written about this same presumption when an
attorney i~ being di,.;lmrred and the most exhaustive treatment j~ found in a receJit Ne\1 Jcrs''Y
case, In the ilfatter of Douga~ Herr, .-Jft,,rney wnd
Connselorat Law,:!.:!. X. J. 276,123 A. 2r1 70fi (1936). 'l'l1is
ease is helpful for t.wo reasons; first, the facts arr. similar
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to those in the instant proceeding, and second, the New
Jersey Conrt requires tlie same proof to overcome a presumption of frand in a civil proceeding as did the Utah
court in the Swan case. Also helpful is the fad tliat this
case was elaborately researehed, argued and re-argued
before tbe Xew Jersey Court of Appeals. "\fr. Justice
Brennan, before ascending to the position of the Ju.stice
of the United States Supreme Court, wrote the opinion,
from whi1·h we quote:
"Respondent has been called upon to answer
~pecific charges of allP;..ced unethi(•al and improper
conduct, principally Hmt i.n -various -way~, for his
rwrsonal profit and gain, he abused and took ad\Untage of the confideu('C reposed in him by his
dient, Mii<~ Bertha Breelnvoldt. By direction of
this court he a rings on the cl1arges were l1ad before
Judge Grim~ha 11· in the Chanerry Division. Judge
Grim shaw filed conclusions finding that some
charges are SlJ~tained by the e-vidence and others
were not. Briefs wen~ submitted io this court and
we have had oral argument and reargument here.''
There was a conflict in tl1e evidence us to }Iiss Brechwoldt':; mental capacity. Respondent l1ad beell the attorney of Miss Rrcehwoldt for a number of years and he
drafted, or (·flu~l'd to be drafted, certain trust instrument,;
and a will for :.\liss Bn'eliwoldt. These instruments made
respondent sole iruslr(' with powers so broad a~ to enable
him to benefit. himself. 'l'hc ('State of l\liss Brechwoldt
exceeded $400,000. Respondent w11s charged with the presumption of fraud in that the fRds were sufficient to
establish a prima farie ease, and respondent attorney was
call('d to come forth and prove himself innocent of any
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improper conduct. He failed to establish his proof, and
he was disbarred. 'l'hc court defined the attorney's duty
in the following words;
''Confidence so reposed has ever been !lufficient reason, in equit.y, for requiring t11e recipient
to ac,•cpt the onus of proving -uberrim-a. fides when
his conduct is called in question. This if! a great
and ancient maxim of equity, applicable to all variety of relations in \\·hich influence or dominion
may be exercised by one person over another:
'That great rule of court, that he who bargains
in matter of advantage with a person placing confidence in him, is hound to show a reasonable usc
of that confidence; a rule applying to trustees,
attorneys, or anyone else.' Gibson v. ,Joyes, 6 Ves.
.Jr. 266, :n l·;ng-. Ucp.l844 (Ch.1801).
"ls the attorney's poflition different when his
conduct is called into question ir1 a disciplinary
pro<.'ccding1 We think it is not, at least when the
court is satisfied with reasonable certainty, as is
the c•ase here, that a 11rima facie case of disciplinary misconduct has been made out against the
at.lorney. In such a case, the decisions uniformly
hold that the burden of overcoming such prima.
facie case by evidence ref!ts on tllC attorney. See
7 CJS, ~'l..ttorncy & Client, Sec. 33, p. 781, where the
following cases are cited: ln re Graves, 64 Cal.
App. 176, 221 Pa. 411 (D. Ct.. App. 19:53); In re
Horovit:r., 228 App. Dlv. 484, 240 NYS 343 (App.
Div. Hl30) ; In re Fieldstccl, 228 App. Div. 470, 240
KYS 481 (App. Div. 1930); In re Kunstler, 248
App. Div. 393, 289 NYS 107 (App. Div. 1936); in
re Salus, 321 Pa.106, 184 A. 70 (S. Ct.1936); In rc
Gery, 284 Pa. 121,130 A. 307 (S. Ct.1925); People
ex rcl. Attorney-General v. La~ka, 105 Col. 426,101
P. 2d 33, (St. Ct. 1940); In re Lennox, 371 TIL 505,
21 XE 2d J21 ( 8. Ct. 1939) ; ln rc .:vr cluick, 383 Til.
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200 48 Nill2d 935 (S. Ct. 1943). As it is abhorrent
to the law and our ethieal code t.lntt an attorney
should derixe a benefit. to himself from the misuse
of the confidence arising from the attorney-clieiJt
relation, ''vhere from the attendant circumstance
there is a reason io ptesume that the attorney possessed some marked influence, ascendancy or other
advantage over his client~ * *' t.he law supersedes
the neeessity of any inquiry into tl11c particular
mean~, l''ftent and exertion of influence in a given
case; a task often diflicult., and ill supported by
evidence which can be drawn from ar1Y satisfaetorv
somces. T Story on Equity ,Turisp;udence (14th
Ed. 1918), sec. 433. Thu~, the court being satisfied
with reasonable certainty that a f!l"ima facie case
of <<lm~e in violation of Cannon 11, hy IITI attorney
of adient'.:; confidence for his personal profit or
g-ain l1as been made out, it is right and just 1o require tktt H1e attorney shall prove either that no
advantage of l1is client 'NUS taken or that the adYantage r0r.eived 11a.~ rr.eeived without a speck of
impn~ition on his JJart and \\"US the result of <i well
eonl:iider0d, definite and sPttlPd purpo~r on the
part of the d.ient.. In t.his wa.'· suhs1ance and meaning arc given to the high princlples of conduct self.
imposed hy our profession and eloquently articulated over a century ago by }[r.•Justice Xclson
:-;peaking for the Cnited States Supreme Court in
Stoekton v. Ford, 11 How. 2~12, ;J2 L S. 232, ~47,
13 L .!<;d. 676 (1850), where he said:
'There are few of the business relations in
life iuvol1·ing a higher trmt and eonfidence
than that of attOI"nl'.'. and client, or generally
speaking, 011e more Jwnorably and faithfully
di~charged; few more anxiously guarded by
th{' InK, or governed b~· sterner principles of
morality and justice; and it is the duty of the
court to administer them in a eorrespondi11g
spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to
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sec that (·onfidcnee thus reposed shall not be
used to the detriment or prejudice of the
rights of the party bestowing it.'
"It is urged on behalf of the respondent that
no presumption of undue influenee on lris part
is createrl merely because he v.raf! named as
truslee of the trnsl and as a similar fiduciary
under t.Jw will, hot.h of whi(•h were prepared
by him, that l"he construct.ive fraud principle
applieable in cases where an attorney is made
a beneficiary of a will or trust ·which is prepared or supervised by himself hal'! no perLint>ncy here because the respondent obtains
no bcnefirial interest under cit.her doeument
other t.han the fees and commissions for which
he works. Bnt while the respondent is not.
named as a cestui under the trust or as a legatee or devise<> under the will of ::\.fis>- Brechwoldt, the pow('rs granted to him arc so complete and the di~{·rciiOTl given him so ah~oluh'
thai ilis vo~itiou is tantamount to that of a
bencfl('iary Further, he hafl treated the funds
as his own ·without regarrl to his oblig11tion io
bis donor or her rharitab\(' bcncfi('iarics.
There is every indication t11at this respondent
had inf!ured to f1imsclf' H1e eo11trol of this esstate even beyond bis ovm lifetime. He put
him~elf into a superior bargaining position aR
far as lllt' ultimate benefieiarief! are eoncerned, so t.hat it would not be pradical for
any ol t.bem to contest his actions because in
the cxereiJ:Je of hiA absolute discretion he had
the power to 'cut them off.' \Ve can gain b11t
a hint of his purpose from the earlier will
under which the respondent made himself a
prineipal beneficiary of "\-Iiss Brechwoldt 'R
bounty. A confidential relationship such as
exiRted here between the respondent and Mi~;;
Brechwoldt, plus the l'>idence of suspicious
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circumstances constituting a strong prima
facie case of misconduct, is enough to cast the
burden on to the respondent to show by impeccably clear and convincing proof his freedom from fraudulent and unduly influential
conduct. In re Rlake's will, 21 ~.J. 50,120 A.
2d 745 (1956); 1n re Rittenhouse's Will, 19
X.J. 370, lli A. 2d 401 (1955). lie has not
come close to carrying that burden.''
"There is nothing wrong in an attorney
accepting the confidence of a client and in
managing his propert; aDd estate if tl1e client
of his 011 n free and unfettered will desires to
place ~url1 a trust in an att.oruey. But such
a situation is fraught with danger for the
attorn0y. 'rbc only way in which l1c can pro"
teet himself i~ tbrough scrupulously proper
conduct, not only iil the manner in which he
deals with the property but in the documentation of his actions. OlJl:· by being able to
show clearly each and every m1e of his transadiom no matter how long the period of time
can he insure himself of being above reproach. It is not enough for him to sa;.c 'I
have acted properly in the performance of
my trust.' He must prove it."
"There is no profession, san perhaps the
ministr.1·, in which the highest morality is
more necessary than that of the law. Sharswood, :H;ssay on Professional EU1i<'s (1896),
p. 55.
'There is in fact, no 1oeation in life where
moral character counts for so much or where
it is subjedC'd 10 more crucial tests by citizen
and the publie than is that of members of the
bar. " • "' The fidelity and candor with
which he performs his trust, point up reasons
that distinguish t1IC legal profession from
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other business.' ~tate ex rei. Florida Bar v .
.Murrell, Fla., 74 So. 2d 221, 224 (Sup. Ct.
1964).

"It has been very aptly said that there is no
profession apart from the legal profession where
there is g-r"(•aler dispar·ity bciwcen hue character
and reputation. Tlre fault lies in the lack of understanding by the public pr:iJ:JCipally provoked by
the iransgessors among ns -not so much by the
flagrant violators, because the public io; quick to
appreciate the inevit.ahlcness of their existence,
but by those members who by unconscionable conduct tip the dcli(Jatc' balmwe in wlricl1 trust and
confidence in a lawyer's actions hangs; not so
much l1y malefactiom! which are branded criminal
hut by those that are in the twilight zone of low
morality.
''\Ve discipline not to puni:;h, but to purify tbe
bar, lo inNo.·a~l' its reputation and to protect the
public and the eourts from fraud and impo.'<ition.
In rc Breidt, 84 N.J. Eq. :!2~-. 214 (Chi. 1915).

"It io; the judgment of the court that the respondent was guilty of violating Canon 11 in the
ways descT"iLed.
"'l'he diseipline imrwsed is tlmt. the respondent he disbarred."

It is true thal this case was decided l1y n t!iviJed
court. 'rhree justi(~cs Uissented, but they did not disagree
with the reasoning of the majority of the court as sd
forth above. ']'he point of eoutention was o:imply a quP.'\tion ol" testamenlary eapacit;' and the assertion that
the purpoRe of diseiplinary proeeedi11gs are to prott>ct
the public rather than to puni:;h tlw attomey. The attorney therein disbarred was not tlwn pnwti(·in~ law a.nd he

33
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

had sufferf'd considemble misfortune since l1is misconduct. The dissenting j u~1 ii·c•fi thought UHtt it was unnecessary to add to bis burden. This is reflected by the following statement from the dissc·nting opinion:
''The reiipondent is now 75 years of age and
ha8 practiced at 1luc liar for 50 years with distinction, having been a member of the judiciary.
lie was humiliatC"d ar1d depressE"d Uy publieity
c•oncerning the aftermath of an unfortunate matrimonial venture, tlE"stroying the prhlc he once
possessed aR an aJJthori.ty in the field of domestic
relations. He is mentally aJHl physically impaired
to a degree where hf' no longer possesses the mind
or the body to permit him to adequately defend
f1im~elf against the charges made.
'' Tn this instance the public needg no further
protection. Xaturc has amply and permanently
proYided it. lle is largely ineapa(•itated mentally
and pl1y~i,·ally and unable to praetice law or any
oU1er u~"ful oeeupation. lie has left the jurisdiction, seeking elsewhere some modicum of comfort
and eon~olation. 'l'he devaf!tatlon wrought hy his
mi~fort1mes jg best reflected in his attempted
SlJicide and the note he left revealing his pathetic
apprai~al of continued worldly existence.
''Tl1e majority concluf!ions, according to my
\·ic·w, ('Ome more within the classification of punis]nrH"Ht of tlu' re01pondent than publi(' protection,
ano:l I t"rmnot. on the record before me, vote to
blo(·k out the few day:; of dim sunshine which still
rernai.n for him.''
'l'h(~ on[~- other C<Jse

can find ,,·hich has fad~ similar to (.l1e fnet~ here present is the nl~C" of In rc Mango;n,
32 A. :ld 673 (Vermont) deciLled in 1943.
Wl"
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In this case one ::!rfary Lamb was a woman 77 years
of age. Her sister had died and she employed an attorney to probate the sister's estate. Before ll1l' probate
could be completed the attorney died and :!."Iangan was
retained to complete the probate proceedings. :\li;;~ Lamb
had a savings account. in a bank of some ~9,000. Shereceived notice from the bank t.hat they would not pay any
intcr·est on money over $5,000. ~fangan had f>Iiss Lamb
withdraw the excess m·er $5,000 and deposit it in a joint
account with him.
At about the same time as the joint account was
created he drew a will for .\1 iH~ Lamb in which he was
named as t.he principal benefleiary. He drew the will and
was prE'sent when it was witnessed.
During 1Ii~s Lamb's lifetime :Mangan withdrew
money from the joiut aecount for his pet·sonal needs with
"\fiss I.amb's consent. Shortly bel"orc 11-Iiss Lamb's death
}Iangan withdrew the full amount and deposited it. to
hi; own account.
The findings of the hearing commission, as set out
in the opinion of tlte coud du not disclose any overt acts
of fraud or undue influenec nn the part of :Jiangan relative to the ereation of tlw joint aceount or the executiOJt of
the will. The Commi.sHion al~o found that TVIaJ"Y l.amb had
tet.amentary capacity. '.rhe judgment of the c.ourt was
that Mangan he disbarred.
The general rule relative to 01<' conduct of attorn,~y·s in their relationship wilh t.heir clients is that any
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adions on his part which casts reflection npon the profession in the eye~:~ of the public makes l1im subject to
di~:~ciplinc.

The Utah Supreme Court ha:; held tl1at the standard
of quantum of proof which should govern the court in
a disbarment proceeding i~:~ that:
'_'t~e

charges sholJltl be clearly sustained by
convwcmg proof and a fair preponderance of the
evidence. 'l'h0 evidence should be clear and
convincing.''
See ln re ii11Cunough, 97 L'tah [J:J3, 95 P. 2d 13. See also
J.n re Erans wnd Rogers, 22 Ctah 366, 62 P. 913, 53 LRA
952, 83 Am St. Hep. 794, and ht re Hanson, 48 l:tah 163,
158 Pae. 7'18.

COXCLlJSION
We have not been able to find other cases either one
way or the other on the presumption problem. If the presumption of fraud is raised in a disbarment proceeding,
then we believe H1at disciplinary actior1 must follow automat.i('ally. Tlw Supreme Court of l·tah 1111:> already held
in the civil pnrt of thi~ matter that the presumption of
fraud in the civil case could be oYercome by a mere preponflerance of the evidence. It then 'n·ut on to hold tl1at.
Mr. Macfarlane had not by a preponderance of tb1• evidence shown freedom from fraud. If there is any presumption at all rais0d in 11 rlisbarment proceeding, it must
be a presumption at le:1st that strong, and if this identical
evidence wn~ not strong enough to overcome the presump-
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tion in the civil case, it likewise does not overcome it in
this case.
"\Ve have here an affirmative proof of questionable
conduct. An attorney employed to protect the property
interests of a person with a retarded ment.ality, accepts
from her during her lifetime many valuable giftf!, he
stands by while like gifts are made to ?\Ir. Kostopoh1~, he
drew a will which makes him a major beneficiary, etc. To
these affirmatively established facts must be added the
adjudicated fact that he has defrauded his client of property with a value of over $100,000.00, and in that adjudication the property has been taken from him. The same
identical evidence is before the Supreme Court again for
review. If (1) the comt can consider the adjudicated fact
of the fraud, or (2) if the court may raise the presumption of fraud, then we think it mnf!t follow that f!ome
discipline is required. If the court may not conflider the
adjudicated fact of the fraud, nor may not raise the presumption because of the nature of a disbarment proceeding, and the fads which give rise to the presumption will
not of themselves warrant diseiplinary adion, then, of
course, the findings should be reversed, and the court
should again advise the public that 1\lr...\tacfarlanc's
conduct was entirely proper and that he is entitled to receive the Supreme Court's recommendation to tho puhlic
that he is a man in whom the public may repose the greatest confidence and trust. and that the har in general may
as a matter of ethics engage in this type of conduct, although if a civil suit is iJlitiatcd agaim;t them, their con37
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duct will be fraudulent and the property must be taken
from them.
"\Ve submit that such au anomalous end result ought
not to be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE
RAY R. CHlllS'J:E~SEN
NED WARNOCK
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